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Abstract— Problems of unusable security in organisations 
are widespread, yet security managers tend not to listen to 
employees’ views on how usable or beneficial security controls 
are for them in their roles. Here we provide a technique to 
drive management of security controls using end-user 
perceptions of security as supporting data. Perception is 
structured at the point of collection using Analytic Hierarchy 
Process techniques, where diagnostic rules filter user responses 
to direct remediation activities, based on recent research in the 
human factors of information security. The rules can guide 
user engagement, and support identification of candidate 
controls to maintain, remove, or learn from. The methodology 
was incorporated into a prototype dashboard tool, and a 
preliminary validation conducted through a walk-through 
consultation with a security manager in a large organisation. It 
was found that user feedback and suggestions would be useful 
if they can be structured for review, and that categorising 
responses would help when revisiting security policies and 
identifying problem controls. 
Keywords-information security; analytic hierarchy process; 
security policies; human factors of security 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Information security managers in organisations introduce 
security mechanisms as controls that users – typically 
employees – are expected to comply with (such as password 
composition rules, access cards to restrict entry to buildings, 
etc.). Users may be expected to comply with a range of 
security controls within their roles. These controls may be 
technical or procedural, but research has shown that they are 
not always effective [6].  
When faced with a security control, users have a choice 
to comply or not to comply [2]. When deciding whether to 
comply, users are influenced by the perceived benefit and 
cost of compliance [3], for instance in terms of the associated 
effort. Individuals consider the benefit and the cost not just 
for themselves, but also for the people around them in the 
organisation [2]. If the effort of compliance is seen as too 
much, employees may avoid specific security controls 
altogether (as has been seen for authentication controls [18]). 
There is then a need for security managers in organisations to 
understand the costs and benefits of security as perceived by 
employees. 
Recent research [11] has shown that even non-expert 
users can articulate their perception of good and bad security 
controls in relation to their role, and that there is scope to 
incorporate these views into the security design process. 
Improvements to security design can reduce the perceived 
workload of security for users in organisations [2]. User 
experiences are however generally ignored in the design of 
security, despite the importance of user involvement to 
system design [20]. Security managers can harness user 
feedback to improve the security of the organisation [11], by 
identifying pain-points and targeting interventions 
accordingly. 
Here we present a methodology to structure user 
perception data at the point of collection, and support 
security managers in subsequent analysis. Users are 
prompted to perform pair-wise comparisons of the controls 
that affect them, comparing usability and usefulness. Follow-
on questions further structure user perceptions toward 
identifying remediation activities, where diagnostic rules 
map these structured perceptions to recommendations 
emerging from the literature. This streamlines the use of 
management resources and introduces human factors of 
security into routine management practices, as seen in other 
work [18].  
As a preliminary validation of the methodology, we 
incorporate the approach into a survey tool for end-users 
(populated with existing user perception data) and a 
dashboard tool for managers, which we present to a security 
manager in a large organisation. This also explores the 
potential of the methodology as part of routine management 
activities, ahead of any wider deployment of the tool. 
Related work is discussed in Section II. We discuss our 
methodology in Section III. Tools incorporating the 
methodology are discussed in Section IV. Validation through 
consultation with a security manager is described in Section 
V. Discussion follows in Section VI, with conclusions 
presented in Section VII.  
II. RELATED WORK 
A number of works characterise user non-compliance 
with security in organisations. Deciding to comply or not to 
comply is a cost-benefit analysis by the user, weighing the 
perceived cost of compliance against the perceived benefit of 
that compliance [2]. Beautement, Sasse and Wonham [2] 
provide general rules, based on interviews with employees in 
organisations, for improving the experience of security 
controls for users, where it is suggested that overburdening 
the user makes compliance less appealing and the 
management of security more costly. We propose directly 
leveraging users’ perception of security as a metric to inform 
changes to security provisioning in organisations.  
Users may also justify non-compliant behaviours through 
neutralising arguments (as in [9]), such as denial of 
responsibility, seeing non-compliant actions as necessary, 
blaming management and unreasonable policies, etc. 
Similarly, Kirlappos et al [6] categorised common reasons 
for non-compliance less in terms of personal justification but 
through the impact that security and policy have on them. 
Reasons include perceived high compliance costs, lack of 
understanding, and unavailability of compliance 
mechanisms, pointing to issues with how security controls 
are managed. These works collectively illustrate that the 
reasons for non-compliance and circumvention of security 
may not be obvious to security managers, and further that 
security mechanisms can hamper the primary task if user 
experience is not considered. Here we propose that user 
perceptions of security can be structured to assist security 
managers in crafting security provisions as an enabler of 
work. 
Without engagement with users, security mechanisms in 
organisations are indifferent to their users [10], and so users 
themselves will act to align security controls with the 
primary task [6]. It has also been shown that heavy costs to 
the end-user encourage habitual, yet rational rejection of 
security [4]. Conversely, an understanding of compliant 
individuals can help organisations to improve productivity, 
and leverage compliant individuals to strengthen information 
security [3]. Other work suggests ways to consider the user 
in security management practices, such as by managing 
policy mandates and demands on user effort with greater 
care [13]. The work presented here identifies when controls 
are rejected or adopted by users, incorporating user 
perspectives into security management processes. 
There are a number of works which model user security 
behaviour in organisations, focusing on security policies 
such as password use [16][17] and USB data transfer [15]. 
Model outputs – rather than user reports - inform 
management decisions, with data that exposes the drivers for 
visible user behaviour. Models are in some cases informed 
by engagements with users and discussion of their security 
behaviours, where here we propose directly eliciting and 
categorising feedback about specific controls. Other work 
has shown that security managers are amenable to 
introducing usability factors into their decision-making 
processes [18], and similarly that Analytic Hierarchy Process 
(AHP) can be used to weigh up alternative security solutions 
(such as a security manager’s own view of available 
solutions) [14]. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
Non-compliance is an opportunity for security managers 
to make security better [12]. Kirlappos et al [6] identified the 
following main reasons for non-compliance: 
 High Compliance Cost. Non-compliance is deemed 
necessary by the user – they made a choice not to 
comply due to more pressing reasons.    
 Lack of Understanding. Inaccurate perception of the 
risks associated with their roles and responsibilities, 
and misunderstanding of a technology’s capability to 
support secure working.  
 Unavailable Compliance Mechanisms. Provisioned 
security solutions do not fit the task. 
By capturing the attitude of users towards security 
mechanisms, a security manager can gain insights into the 
reasons for both compliance and non-compliance. 
Prior work has shown that employees’ experience of 
security differs across groups of users in an organisation (see 
Section III.A), and that users can articulate views of security 
controls such as policies and technologies. Here we look at 
how findings from that prior work and similar research can 
inform the structuring of user feedback during elicitation, to 
produce data that the manager can use when looking or ways 
to improve security provisions (Section III.B). User 
perceptions of security are captured and categorised 
according to user-defined weightings of the usability and 
usefulness of controls. Diagnostic rules use research insights 
to guide remediation efforts by security managers (Section 
III.C). 
A. Use of Existing Security Perception Data 
Associated work analysed a set of interviews conducted 
with 118 employees holding various positions at a large 
multinational organisation [11]. Excerpts from these 
interviews are representative of how security is perceived by 
users.  
The interviews were one-to-one, semi-structured, and 
approximately 50 minutes in duration, exploring employee 
interaction with – and sentiment toward – their 
organisation’s security policies and controls. The interviews 
touched upon security awareness and compliance, including 
the impact of security on a person’s role, views of the 
organisational support for security, and knowledge of the 
existence of security policies and mechanisms. The 
interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analysed by the 
work’s authors, producing a preliminary thematic analysis 
that informs this paper. 
The analysis is relevant to understanding the information 
employees might provide about security controls if 
prompted. The interviews also illustrate that employees are 
able to articulate the impact of security upon their work. For 
one, some participants elaborated on situations when 
following prescribed security behaviour resulted in slower 
completion of primary business tasks, or security 
mechanisms prevented completion of the primary task 
altogether. 
Analysis suggested a general perception that the 
organisation did not listen to employee feedback, and did not 
respond to shortcomings in security adequately or in good 
time. Developing a capability to listen to employees and act 
on feedback informs improvements, but also conveys a 
dedication to maintaining good security for the organisation. 
Findings from the interview study and related work have 
begin to characterise security experiences, and how user 
feedback may be collected, categorised, and applied to 
support management decisions in a more structured manner. 
We used extracts from the interviews as test user data for the 
methodology and tool (Section IV). 
B. Categorising Controls 
To categorise users’ perception of security, we capture an 
employee’s view of the Usability and Usefulness of security-
related controls (any set of mechanisms, systems, and 
policies that factor into an employee’s working day). 
Controls are rated against each other, to identify controls 
which may be a bad fit to the primary task, or their purpose 
poorly communicated. Controls that are successful can also 
be identified. The goal is to diagnose problem controls to 
investigate further, or indeed success stories to learn from.   
Analytic Hierarchy Process (AHP) is used in the 
comparison process. AHP is a technique to make individual 
or group multi-criteria decisions [8]. Pairwise comparisons 
are made between choices, to identify the best alternative. 
Crucially, the AHP technique can be used to measure 
intangible psychological events, such as the beliefs of an 
individual [7]. This capacity to build metrics from beliefs is 
applied for weighing criteria relatively, where criteria are 
rated according to an individual’s personal judgment. 
Successive pair-wise comparisons populate a pairwise matrix 
of relative weights, so that preferences can be quantified 
without having a unit of measurement. 
In our method, we have two rounds of pairwise 
comparisons across the set of controls in an organisation:  
 Usability: The user is asked to compare controls 
based on how usable they find them. Inversely this 
may be the Perceived Pain, as the user will 
experience competition between primary and 
security tasks – if security feels effortful, it can 
become a burden [2]. 
 Usefulness: The user is asked to compare controls 
based on the Perceived Benefit to them in their role. 
Pairs of controls are compared along a bounded scale, 
where the centre position indicates that two controls are 
equally preferable, and a selection toward one end of the 
scale indicates a preference for the control associated with 
that side. In this work, users are encouraged not to pick the 
centre value – any distinction between two controls can help 
the manager focus remediation efforts. 
Each control is compared to every other control. The 
user’s choices populate a comparison matrix, and priority 
vectors of the user are created for both usability and 
usefulness. The control with the highest weight denotes the 
most usable (or useful) control, and the one with the lowest 
weight denotes the least usable (or useful) control. 
AHP emphasises consistency in pairwise comparisons – 
that is, if control A is preferred more than control B, and B is 
preferred more than control C, then A must be preferred 
more than C. A consistency ratio is calculated from the 
values in the matrix. Saaty [8] argues that a matrix with a 
consistency ratio beyond 10% is not acceptable. Users are 
afforded some room for inconsistency here, as they are not 
assumed to be security experts in their own right. Responses 
lacking consistency are still useful to the security manager: 
users can be confused by controls or disengaged from them 
[18], or it may be that they are making guesses about 
controls that do not apply to them. 
After every user completes the comparison ratings, 
controls are categorised according to the two comparison 
metrics, and targeted follow-up questions asked to capture 
comments relating to each control. 
Each control is sorted into one of four categories based 
on their Pain and Benefit weightings, as in Table I. Three of 
these categories are based on the three non-compliance 
situations listed in [6] and reported in Section III. The fourth 
category is considered an ideal, where impact on the user is 
limited and the benefit of the control to a person’s role is 
perceived to be high. Each category has three associated 
refinements that further categorise attitudes towards a 
control, where the refinements are representative of 
prominent views elicited during the prior in-depth interviews 
(Section II.A). The user selects a refinement statement and 
can provide further comments to add more context, should 
they wish to. The categories and refinements structure 
feedback for review by the security manager later. 
C. Categorising Group Responses 
Diagnostic rules were developed which collate individual 
responses and determine the relative perception of each 
control in a set, for groups of users and the whole 
organisation. Users are identified as far as being a member of 
a department, where it is assumed that a group of users has a 
similar set of primary tasks, and that it is large enough to 
ensure anonymity of user feedback. However, it is noted that 
issues can also develop amongst smaller teams within 
departments [11]. 
AHP can also capture group decisions, and so is used to 
generate overall Pain and Benefit values as a combination of 
responses from a group of users, not only for the entire 
organisation but also for each individual department. If the 
matrix values for a user are very inconsistent there is no 
concrete action that can be taken from the feedback itself, 
however inconsistent responses can identify where there is a 
disconnect between users and security. If this occurred 
across large groups of users, it would imply a “worst case” 
for streamlining remediation efforts, where users must be 
engaged directly and at length with no prior perception data. 
We use the diagnostic rules to look for inconsistencies 
and potential explanations for values across the organisation 
and within departments, at the level of individual controls. 
We give corresponding recommendations on how the 
security manager can craft investigation activities, 
incorporating findings from prior interview-based research of 
the human factors of security in organisations [2][6][11][12]. 
These works illustrate that particular perceptions can indicate 
specific remediation activities without requiring in-depth 
interviews, affording a security manager opportunities to 
start aligning security with the needs of users. Structuring 
data according to these insights also limits the need for a 
security manager to be well-versed in the human factors of 
security.  The diagnostic rules are outlined in Table II. 
TABLE I.  CATEGORIES AND REFINEMENTS 
Category Pain Benefit Refinement 
Ideal Low High 
I like it just because it is quite 
simple to comply. 
I like it because it is very 
important for security. 
I like it because it is both 
important for me and easy to 
use. 
Could Comply, 
But Why 
Should I? 
Low Low 
It is pointless. 
I do not mind using it, although 
I’m not sure of the point of it. 
It does not bother me that 
much. 
Could Comply, 
But Cost too 
High 
Hig
h 
High 
I understand why it is there, but 
it is not integrated well 
generally. 
The plan is good, but it is not 
implemented well. 
I am not sure where they went 
wrong, but it is irritating. 
Something’s 
Awry, Just 
Can’t Comply 
Hig
h 
Low 
It is useless in general. 
I do not see how it relates to 
my work. 
I know what can be done 
instead. 
The diagnostic rules identify ways to apply user 
responses: 
 Inter-Control: One control is compared to another. 
This can quickly identify controls with either far 
better or far worse Usability or Usefulness than other 
controls. When all controls are considered equal we 
cannot be sure if they are all equally usable or 
unusable, and so need a means to differentiate. In 
case of a Usability deadlock (where all controls have 
equal values), Usefulness is also taken into account. 
In cases of a Usefulness deadlock we compare the 
self-reported knowledge of controls (also captured). 
 Intra-Control: Examine differences of perception for 
an individual control. The majority opinion for a 
control is compared with that of each distinct user 
group. There may be Inconsistent Perception across 
the organisation or within a particular department, 
and there is no clear majority opinion. This may 
occur where security micro-cultures have developed 
amongst teams [11]. There may otherwise be 
Deviation, when there is a clear majority opinion, 
but a specific group of users representing a minority 
view (e.g., one group may have reached or exceeded 
their perceived available effort for compliance based 
upon the controls they are tasked with using [2], or 
rationalised that controls are not worth the effort 
[4]).  
The following excerpt is an example of an Intra-Control 
Inconsistency, where perception of USB data transfer policy 
differs between two members of the same department (from 
the same interviews that informed [11], as in Section II.A): 
 
P32: 
I: “Okay, are you aware of any policies around their 
use?” 
P: “Yes, the major policy … is that they have to be a 
company [flash drive], they can't be an external [flash 
drive].” 
 
P34: 
I: “do you ever use USB flash drives at all?” 
P: “I do.”  
I: “Do you know if there's any kind of policies 
around their use?”  
P: “No, I don't.” 
 
Alongside organisation-wide categorisation, it is also 
possible to identify intra-control differences in specific 
departments. These differences may arise because of the 
work tasks performed within a department, or some other 
department-specific factor that promotes different attitudes.  
The rules can suggest a range of information-gathering 
and remediation activities. This can include investigation of 
what it is that users appreciate about a “good” control (as it 
may be that traits can be copied to another control). If a 
control is provoking a range of reactions amongst users, 
direct engagement may be required to understand the cause 
(such as through in-depth exploratory interviews similar to 
those described in Section A). Enacting changes in 
technology or procedures without considering user 
experiences can perpetuate existing problems or cause 
further damage [11], and so rather than advocating specific 
controls, here we help managers explore the fit of controls to 
users’ working lives.  
Prior work suggests that reviewing the design of security 
measures is the most direct way to reduce mental and 
physical demands upon users [2], and that users are a useful 
source of information about how to improve those designs 
[11][12], so design activities and application of feedback 
drive the majority of diagnostic activities in Table II. 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION 
The methodology informed a prototype survey and 
dashboard toolset, built to investigate the viability of 
incorporating human factors thinking into security 
management. The tool has two components; the End-user 
Tool (for collecting user opinions of security controls) and 
the Manager Tool (which presents analysis and responses). 
A. End-user Tool 
As a running example, the security manager has chosen 
four security policies as the controls to gather opinions about 
– Password Policy, Email Policy, USB Policy and Clear 
Desk Policy. The following steps make up the process for the 
user: 
1. Initialising: The user indicates their department. 
2. Knowledge Phase: The user rates each control on 
how well they think they know them. This uses a 
set of indicative comments produced from the 
interview analysis described in Section III.A.  
 
 
TABLE II.  INTER-CONTROL AND INTRA-CONTROL DIAGNOSTIC RULES 
Classification Situation Reason Recommendation 
Inter-Control 
Usability 
Pain of Control-1 far higher 
than Pain of all other Controls 
Control-1 has some inherent 
problem  
Control-1 needs to be improved, or removed entirely if unworkable 
(use User feedback to identify actions)  
Pain of Control-1 far lesser 
than Pain of all other Controls  
Control-1 has some likeable 
characteristics  
Control-1 can be used as an ideal control (use User feedback to 
understand what is perceived as good)  
Pain of all Controls nearly 
equal   
Controls are all equally usable 
OR equally unusable  
1) A mixture of: 
a) Users are willing   to comply – use control-specific feedback to 
determine if controls are usable OR unusable 
b) Integration of the Controls  needs to better aligned with the culture 
of the organisation, examine comments 
c) There may have been changes in the business goals, talk to team 
managers    
2) Revisit all controls, review all per-control responses 
Usefulness 
Benefit of Control-1 far higher 
than Benefit of all other 
Controls  
Control-1 has high perceived 
benefit  
1. The control integrates well with the primary task of users, and is a 
candidate ideal control, and/or; 
2. Users appreciate the need for it, so communication around the 
control is good 
Benefit of Control-1 far lesser 
than Benefit of all other 
Controls  
Control-1 has low perceived 
benefit  
There is a need to improve communication or consider removal (review 
control-specific comments) 
Benefit of all Controls equal,  
1. Knowledge of all high  
2. Knowledge of all low    
3. Knowledge is random    
1. Users may understand the 
control enough for their role, OR 
not know at all    
2. Perceived Benefit low for all  
3. There is confusion about the 
full range of  controls 
1. Determine if users know the controls, OR if there are widespread 
misconceptions    
2. Controls need to be communicated better  
3. Take an altogether new approach to communicating controls, as 
there is a systemic issue  
Intra-Control 
Inconsistent 
Perception 
 
Two different Pain extremes 
for Control/Department  
Control has different burden on 
different users  
1. Recognise the primary tasks that are affected more than others  
2. Revisit the grouping of users based on their primary tasks  
Pain distributed for 
Control/Department  
Control not aligned well to users’ 
primary tasks  
Understand varying primary tasks of users, and improve control to 
accommodate new understanding (start with Department-specific 
comments) 
Two different Benefit extremes 
for Control/Department  
Goal of the control is not clear  Communicate the goal of the control in a better manner  
Benefits distributed for the 
Control/Department  
1. Control itself not clear    
2. Communication is weak    
1. Make the control more   understandable    
2. Revisit how the control is communicated    
Deviation 
Low Pain for a Department 
(Group) within a High Pain 
Control (Department) 
Workaround possibly established 
within Department (Group)  
Monitor for possible workarounds for the control, to improve the 
control 
High Pain for a Department 
(Group) within a Low Pain 
Control (Department)  
Possibly low technical support 
for the Department (Group)  
Explore views of the entire Department/Group in more detail  
High Benefit for a group within 
a Low Benefit Department  
1. Naturally complying 
individuals within a Department  
2. Good Control    
1. Monitor to identify the group, and reward – others will copy good 
behaviour 
2. Replicate the good qualities of the control  
High Benefit for a Department 
within a Low Benefit Control  
1. Department understands the 
reason for the control better (This 
Control might be important for 
their primary task)    
2. Department has a good 
security  culture    
1. Understand why it is important – control may complement primary 
tasks 
2. Show recognition of the Department, perhaps through rewards 
 
3. Usability Phase: Each control is compared to all 
others in sequence to assess Usability (e.g., 
Password against Email, Password against USB, 
Password against Clear Desk) – see Figure 1. 
When comparing n controls against each other, 
there must be a total of n(n- 1)/2 comparisons. 
There will be a total of n-1 such steps to complete 
all possible comparisons. The number of controls 
being reviewed then influences the length of the 
process, and in turn how usable the tools are for 
security managers themselves. 
4. Usefulness Phase: Follows the same structure as 
Step 3, but to inform the perceived Usefulness of 
controls. 
5. Follow-up Phase: The controls (or policies, as in 
our running example) will each have been assigned 
one of the four categories as per Table I (see 
Section III.B). In this last phase, further follow-up 
questions are asked to narrow the reasoning for the 
ratings. The user is presented with three 
refinements corresponding to a control’s category. 
On selecting a refinement, users can provide 
further free-text feedback. A lack of feedback from 
a user group could indicate that they are too busy, 
or that they are deliberately limiting interactions 
with security. 
An example of “ideal” user feedback for Password Policy 
could be as follows (extracted from the interview set 
described in Section III.A), where the user discusses 
password reset time and password complexity in fine detail: 
“I wish it was sort of 3 months rather than every month. 
I think…I’d rather have a longer password …it’s still is 
it 8/9 characters long /yeah/ and a mixture of uppercase 
[and] lower case and all that sort of stuff. You know, I’d 
rather have a 10 figure password and change it every 3 
months, than an 8 one and change it every month” 
B. Manager Tool 
The manager can use this dashboard to configure the user 
tool, analyse user responses, and view recommendations. 
Navigation of user responses is by Control or by Department. 
The manager can choose to view perception data for 
controls by Usability, Usefulness, or Both. There is also a 
drop-down list to compare against a particular department. 
Bar charts are available that show overall weights for the 
selected criteria, including series comparing overall data with 
that of a specific department (see Figure 2). This supports 
use of the data by security managers; summary data can 
provide a top-level view, and “drilling down” opens up more 
detailed information. 
A ‘Show Issues’ button highlights control-specific 
diagnostic recommendations, otherwise organisation-wide 
recommendations are shown. If a particular department is 
selected, the recommendations are shown for that 
department. Recommendations are presented as a Reason-
Action pair, where for each recommendation a reason and 
follow-up activity is suggested, as per Table II.  
 
 
 
Figure. 1. Pairwise comparison of controls in the End-user Tool. 
When a manager selects a Category, a pie-chart is 
displayed representing the quotient of users that chose each 
of the refinements in that Category, serving as a high-level 
indication of users’ attitudes towards a specific control. User 
comments for the selected control are displayed alongside 
the chart. 
V. VALIDATION 
A. Validation Approach 
As a preliminary validation of the approach, a security 
manager in a large organisation (many thousands of 
employees and contractors) was shown the User View 
(Section IV.A) and Manager View (Section IV.B) - where 
the tool had been populated with test response data - and 
asked a series of questions to guide discussion, including: 
 Are there any tools or channels through which you 
already approach the problem? 
 Do you believe users have enough knowledge of 
controls to provide answers that can be useful?  
 Could individual recommendations be acted upon?  
 How willing are you to go through comments to 
understand the basis for complaints or suggestions?  
 How willing would you be to use feedback and 
recommendations to tackle compliance issues in 
your organisation? 
 Can the tool link in to any existing 
(regular/irregular) security management activities? 
B. Results 
1) Current Practice  
The security manager has previously used surveys sent to 
users to gather information about their views on security, 
but this happens irregularly, if at all: "main reason for that 
is time, no time or resources … but it’s definitely something 
we’d like to do”. Instead, the manager might take a guess at 
what to do about security problems, rather than do nothing, 
though in fact "it’s the taking action bit that takes the time”. 
Referring to the diagnostic rules, and specifically 
learning from a “good” control: “you’d have to find out why 
they liked it, but it’s definitely worth doing”. On maintaining 
security policies that affect users, “to go through the whole 
lot it would take a year, and by the time you’ve got through 
them all another year has passed”. 
 
 
Figure. 2. “Pain” and “Benefit” bar charts in the Manager Tool. 
2) Value of User Feedback 
The security manager believed it is “definitely better to 
ask the users what the problem is, rather than making a 
guess”, and that “at the moment it’s quicker and easier to 
make that guess”, although “you can guess, but I’m sure 
there are other aspects that aren’t obvious”. On the value of 
user suggestions for improvements, “they’re the ones that 
have to use it, so in a way they kind of know best really, they 
give a perspective that chances are we wouldn’t have 
thought of”, although “I’m sure there’ll be some ideas that 
aren’t doable, but you never know”. Engagement with users 
was seen as beneficial for both the security manager and the 
employees in an organisation: “Saves us from wasting our 
time creating something that isn't unusable or won’t be used. 
It saves their time if we can make something easier to use.” 
Regarding the visibility of non-compliance, “it’s 
impossible to know unless someone comes to tell you, so the 
only way to know is to ask people". It may be that “people 
don’t know [policy is] there or they don’t know how to apply 
it, [so] something like this would help … in improving it”. 
3) Tool Features 
The manager appreciated being able to see department 
responses alongside responses for the whole organisation. 
Regarding collection and display of user comments: “the 
comments are the most important thing, and you should try 
and encourage more to put their comments, because 
especially if you get lots of different people saying the same 
thing, you know there’s clearly something wrong”. Referring 
again to the issue of how long it takes to investigate non-
compliance … “it would be difficult to go through them if 
you get lots and lots but how else do you know how to 
improve something or why someone is finding something so 
difficult to use?”  
Categorisation of user feedback and comments was seen 
as useful, however “it’s worth splitting out on why they find 
it difficult to use, and their ideas on how to improve it, so … 
when you want to improve something, you can look at all the 
‘improvement’ comments in one go". 
4) Application of the Tool 
The tool was not expected to see continuous use, by users 
or managers. Instead, the manager thought the tool (or 
something similar) could be used in the management of 
security policy, gathering user feedback “a certain period of 
time before [updating policy] so that you could incorporate 
those findings into the updating process”. Tying user 
feedback to the crafting of policy, “If something happens 
that shouldn’t have, because it was in policy, it would be 
useful to then see if people didn’t know about policy, or if it 
was too difficult”. Irregular events may also warrant use of 
the tool, such as any restructuring within the organisation, or 
when a number of new staff members join the organisation. 
A tool like the prototype could help with understanding 
the root of specific compliance issues – the example was 
given of copyright infringement in the workplace: “You 
usually only have to tell them once or block them once and 
they won’t do it again. It would be interesting to know what 
peoples’ opinions are on it first.” 
The tool might fit into existing processes, rather than 
being isolated from other decision-support tools: “[past] 
surveys were an online thing, whereas we might want to go 
into departments and talk to people face-to-face, so this 
could be integrated”. However, “we’d still have to go 
directly to people, things we ask them are a much broader 
thing, but we wouldn’t have gone into this level of detail.” 
It was suggested that the methodology and tool be 
repurposed to manage risks: “wouldn’t have been looking at 
just certain controls, security in general, data … rather the 
assets” … “user view on assets is important from a risk 
perspective … useful to know what they’re doing and how we 
can help them do it better” … “say they’re doing something 
with a certain type of data that they shouldn’t be, identifying 
what they’re doing, if it’s wrong, and educating them”. 
The security manager also made the point that there may 
need to be a certain level of maturity in the security 
management process before using a tool such as this. 
VI. DISCUSSION 
Although the validation session involved only one 
security manager, a number of relevant factors were 
identified. There are costs to resolving issues with security 
controls, and yet “doing something rather than nothing” 
without consulting end-users has been a standard approach 
for many years [1]. Efforts to make user feedback more 
accessible and cheaper to gather can help to guarantee that 
remediation actions support users, rather than cause more 
problems. 
Although there is interest in hearing user concerns, they 
may only be considered during policy review, which can be a 
lengthy process that does not happen regularly. Other work 
has proposed that considering the attitudes of users toward 
security should be considered during policy implementation 
to reduce non-compliance [2]. Applying the methodology 
during policy review would fit with interventions suggested 
elsewhere [2], such as making controls less difficult to use 
and communicating the applicability of controls to users’ 
roles. 
Manager comments supported the diagnostic rules in 
many ways, indicating that if many users are giving controls 
poor ratings that this alone is cause for action to be taken. 
There was support for identifying reasons for non-
compliance before acting to fix problems, aligning with the 
intended use of the diagnostic rules to guide engagement 
with users. It is of note that some issues – such as copyright 
infringement – could be resolved once and no longer be a 
concern, however as was discussed, the hiring of new staff 
can mean that previously-resolved issues need then to be 
revisited, perhaps outside of regular policy review. 
Potential was seen in using user feedback about security 
mechanisms, aligning with research showing that where 
employees may modify improper or inadequate security to 
produce their own alternative solutions, their rationale for 
doing so can identify improvements [11][12]. It was implied 
that there would always be some ideas that are unworkable, 
suggesting further ways to analyse comments and find value 
on user feedback. 
A. Limitations 
One limitation of the approach is that “Pain” may 
manifest for a user when the cumulative effort of using a set 
of controls adds together to become burdensome [2]. Free-
text comments are then critical for characterising how “bad” 
each control is. 
In a real organisation there may be countless distinct 
security controls (policies, technologies, etc.). As implied in 
Section IV.A, each pairwise comparison adds time to the 
process of gathering feedback, making the process 
potentially laborious. Managers would then need a rationale 
for focusing investigation on a limited set of controls, for 
instance according to risk assessments or asset manifests (as 
alluded to during validation, Section V). Minimising the 
effort of using the tool is important, to encourage managers 
to adopt the methodology rather than enact changes without 
consulting end-users. To that end, consultation with 
additional security managers could assess the benefits and 
costs of current approaches to end-user engagement and 
remediation of problematic security controls. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Security managers in organisations need to understand 
how security affects end-users’ work, and how users 
perceive security, toward investigating how to make 
improvements. We present a technique to enable security 
managers to capture user perspectives of security in a 
structured manner, as input to managing improvements. In 
addition, we present diagnostic rules that interpret collected 
data to produce guidance on how to proceed in investigation 
and remediation activities. 
We demonstrate the technique as a dashboard tool, for 
both capturing user perception of security and to help a 
security manager navigate user responses. As preliminary 
validation the tool and the supporting diagnostic rules were 
discussed with a security manager in a large organisation, 
showing that it has potential to reduce problematic security 
deployments and align with existing management practices.  
In future, our methodology would ideally see wider 
deployment and validation, to determine its correctness for a 
large user base and a larger set of security managers 
respectively. Comparative analysis of the technique 
alongside existing approaches for user engagement will 
inform what is gained and lost in data structure and detail, 
but also in capacity to represent actual behaviours (when 
compared to e.g., interviews [6] or combined interviews and 
site observations [21]). Future work will also use perceptions 
of security to quantify the effort of compliance and to 
anticipate when users feel over-burdened. Findings from 
wider research may potentially be incorporated to further 
structure the diagnostic process and assist security managers 
in navigating user responses, for instance to identify 
plausible solutions within user comments. 
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